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Abstract
It has been shown that Information-Disturbance theorem can play an
important role in security proof of quantum cryptography. The theorem
is by itself interesting since it can be regarded as an information theo-
retic version of uncertainty principle. It, however, has been able to treat
restricted situations. In this paper, the restriction on the source is aban-
doned, and a general information-disturbance theorem is obtained. The
theorem relates information gain by Eve with information gain by Bob.
1 Introduction
In 1984, Bennett and Brassard[1] proposed a protocol to realize key distribu-
tion that uses quantum theory in its essential part. In spite of simplicity of
the protocol, its unconditional security proof[2, 3, 4, 5] appeared more than a
decade later after its proposal. Among the various existing proofs, a proof by
Biham et al.[5] employs a so-called information-disturbance theorem[6, 7, 8, 9]
that can be regarded as an information theoretical version of the uncertainty
relation. We, in [10], succeeded in deriving an improved variation of the theo-
rem. Our theorem expressed a relation between information gain by Eve and
randomness of error contained in Bob’s data. Although it has a natural form,
its applicability is still restricted. In fact the state prepared by Alice has to be
ensembles consisting of pure states with even probability. In this paper, we get
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rid of this strong condition and show fairly generalized form of the information-
disturbance theorem. Alice prepares an arbitrary state by one of two different
ensembles. That is, Alice chooses one of two random variables to be encoded.
Each ensemble does not need to consist of distinguishable states. Our new
information-disturbance theorem represents a relation between Eve’s informa-
tion gain and Bob’s information gain. According to the theorem, if Eve employs
an attack that gives her large information on an encoded random variable, Bob
could obtain small information on another random variable. This trade-off is
determined by noncommutativity between the ensembles. The theorem is de-
rived by using remote ensemble preparation technique and entropic uncertainty
relation. These technique also allows us to obtain a simple derivation of the
result in [10]. In section2, we give a brief review on positive operator valued
measure and entropic uncertainty relation that play central roles in our proof.
In section3, we introduce a method to prepare remotely an ensemble of quantum
states by making a proper measurement on predistributed quantum state. In
section4, our main theorems are presented.
2 Preliminaries
We begin with a brief introduction of relevant notions in quantum theory: pos-
itive operator valued measure and entropic uncertainty relation.
2.1 Positive Operator Valued Measure (POVM)
A quantum system is described by a Hilbert space and operators acting on
it. The most general observable is represented by a positive operator valued
measure (POVM) (see, e.g. [11]). A positive operator valued measure A(·) is a
map from measurable space (Ω,F) to a set of positive operators satisfying:
(i) For all S1, S2 ∈ F satisfying S1 ∩ S2 = φ, A(S1 ∪ S2) = A(S1) + A(S2)
holds.
(ii) A(Ω) = 1 holds.
Hereafter we treat only the case that the measurable set is a finite set. Therefore
the conditions above can be rephrased as follows. A POVM is a family of
positive operators {Aa}a∈Ω satisfying
∑
a∈ΩAa = 1. Each a ∈ Ω corresponds
to a measurement outcome. A POVM is called as a projection valued measure
(PVM) if Aa is a projection operator for all a ∈ Ω. A state is described by
a so-called density operator. A density operator ρ is defined by an operator
satisfying ρ ≥ 0 and trρ = 1. If one measures an observable A = {Aa} in a
state ρ, one obtains an outcome a with probability tr(ρAa). From a POVM
A = {Aa} one can construct a self adjoint operator Aˆ :=
∑
a∈Ω aAa. This
operator is useful since it gives the expectation value for the measurements so
that 〈A〉ρ = tr(ρAˆ). For PVM, the standard deviation can be calculated as
∆Aρ = (〈Aˆ
2〉ρ − 〈Aˆ〉
2
ρ)
1/2.
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2.2 Entropic Uncertainty Relation
As is widely known, the uncertainty relation is the most fundamental result
of quantum theory. It, in general, is expressed by an inequality. The uncer-
tainty relation treats two (or more) observables. Incompatibility of probability
distributions of their measurement outcomes is bounded by noncommutativity
between them. The most famous one is the Robertson-type uncertainty relation
for PVMs:
∆Aρ∆Bρ ≥
1
2
tr(ρ[Aˆ, Bˆ])|
where ∆Aρ (∆Bρ) represents standard deviation of the outcome of the corre-
sponding observables. However, to characterize randomness of measurement
outcomes, the standard deviation is often insufficient. The standard deviation
depends on how to assign a value of measurement outcome to each event. For
instance, let us imagine an observable which takes 0, 1 and 2 as its value of
measurement outcome. If a state gives an outcome 0 or 1 with probability 1/2,
its standard deviation is 1/2. On the other hand, if we shuffle the values of
outcome so that the new observable takes an outcome 0 or 2 with probability
1/2, its standard deviation becomes 1. In addition, the above Robertson-type
formulation cannot deal with the most general type of measurement, positive
operator value measure (POVM) measurement. The entropic uncertainty rela-
tion can cover this type of measurement and is of advantage to its application.
It has the following form:
H(A|ρ) +H(B|ρ) ≥ −2 logmax
a,b
‖A1/2a B
1/2
b ‖,
where A := {Aa} and B := {Bb} are POVMs and H(A|ρ) (H(B|ρ)) represents
Shannon entropy of the probability distribution of the measurement outcome
of A (B) in a state ρ, i.e., H(A|ρ) = −
∑
a∈Ω tr(ρAa) log tr(ρAa). This type
of uncertainty relation was first proposed by Deutsch[12] and was improved by
Maassen and Uffink[13]. The above general form for POVMs was obtained by
Krishna and Parthasarathy[14].
3 Remote Ensemble Preparation
In this section we explain a way to prepare an ensemble of quantum states on
a remotely located quantum system by using predistributed entangled state. It
plays an essential role to prove impossibility of the bit commitment. It has been
used to translate the BB84 quantum key distribution into E91 quantum key dis-
tribution. The theorem was first proved by Hughston, Jozsa and Wootters[15],
and generalized by Halvorson[16] for the most general quantum system includ-
ing infinite systems. We, in this paper, treat only finite quantum systems that
are described by finite dimensional Hilbert spaces. Suppose there exist two
characters: Alice and Bob. Each of them has a quantum system. The system
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possessed by Alice (Bob) is called as system A (system B). Alice (Bob) can ma-
nipulate only the system A (system B). The system A (system B) is described
by a Hilbert space HA (HB). We assume that they have an identical finite
dimension, HA ≃ HB ≃ C
N . We consider a method to prepare an ensemble
of states on the system B by Alice’s operation on a predistributed entangled
state |Φ〉. A normalized vector of the composite system, |Φ〉 ∈ HA ⊗ HB, can
be written as, thanks to Schmidt decomposition theorem,
|Φ〉 =
∑
k
√
λk|e
A
k 〉 ⊗ |e
B
k 〉,
where {|eAk 〉} ({|e
B
k 〉}) is an orthonormal basis of HA (HB). We hereafter fix a
normalized vector |Φ〉 and its corresponding basis. HA and HB are identified
with respect to these basis. We write its reduced state on each system as,
ρA =
∑
k
λk|e
A
k 〉〈e
A
k |
ρB =
∑
k
λk|e
B
k 〉〈e
B
k |.
When we identify these two Hilbert space, we simply write them as ρ(≡ ρA ≡
ρB). Suppose that the state ρA can be decomposed into a mixture of the states
as ρA =
∑
i piρ
A
i , where ρ
A
i is a state of the system A for each i and {pi}
satisfies
∑
i pi = 1 and pi ≥ 0. Hereafter, for simplicity, we assume rankρ = N .
In the following, we consider a measurement by Alice that prepares the state ρi
with the probability pi on the system B attached to Bob. We define transpose
operation with respect to the basis {|eAk 〉}. Since the transpose operation A 7→
tA preserves the positivity of the operator, a family of operators,
F [{pj, ρj}] := {F [{pj, ρj}]i} := {piρ
−1/2 tρiρ
−1/2} (1)
forms a POVM. Let us take the state |Φ〉 and consider an a-posteriori state
with respect to the POVM F [{pj, ρj}]. A probability to obtain an outcome i is
calculated as
〈Φ|F [{pj, ρj}]|Φ〉 =
∑
k
λk〈e
A
k |F [{pj, ρj}]i|e
A
k 〉
=
∑
k
λkpi〈e
A
k |ρ
−1/2ρiρ
−1/2|eAk 〉
= pitr(ρρ
−1/2ρiρ
−1/2) = pi.
Since Alice does not make any operation on the system B, the a-posteriori state
of the system B for the outcome i is calculated as 〈Φ|F [{pj , ρj}]iA|Φ〉/pi. Since
for each operator A on HB,
〈Φ|F [{pj , ρj}]iA|Φ〉 =
∑
k,l
√
λkλl〈ek|ρ
−1/2 tρiρ
−1/2|el〉〈ek|A|el〉
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=
∑
k,l
√
λkλl〈el|ρ
−1/2ρiρ
−1/2|ek〉〈ek|A|el〉
= pitr(ρiA)
holds, where we used a relation tρ = ρ, the a-posteriori state of the system B
is ρi. We thus proved the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Suppose that there exist Hilbert spaces HA, HB and a normal-
ized vector |Φ〉 ∈ HA ⊗ HB. Assume that the reduced density operator ρ :=
trHB (|Φ〉〈Φ|) can be decomposed into a mixture of states as, ρ =
∑
i piρi. There
exists a POVM F [{pj, ρj}] = {F [{pj, ρj}]i on HA that prepares the ensemble
{pi, ρi} on HB . That is, the probability to obtain an outcome i is pi, and the
a-posteriori state of HB then is ρi.
4 Information-Disturbance theorem
In this section, we derive two types of Information-Disturbance theorem. Both
treat a cryptographic setting. The first one relates information gain by Eve with
information gain by Bob. The second one relates information gain by Eve with
randomness of error contained in Bob’s outcome.
4.1 Information v.s. Information
We deal with a quantum cryptographic setting. It is a simplified version of
the BB84 protocol. Three characters: Alice, Bob, and Eve, play their roles.
Alice has a quantum system described by an N -dimensional Hilbert space, HA.
She prepares a state ρ of this system in one of the two different methods: (a)
she prepares a state ρi with probability pi for each i, or (b) she prepares a
state σl with probability ql for each l. To assure that both procedures actually
give the state ρ, we impose a condition, ρ =
∑
i piρi =
∑
l qlσl. We write X
(Y ) a random variable whose value takes i (l) with the probability pi (ql). The
preparation can be regarded as encodingX or Y to the state ρ. The full protocol
runs as follows:
(i) Alice chooses one of the two methods, (a) or (b), to prepare the state ρ.
(ii) Alice prepares the state ρ according to her choice on the method. That
is, Alice encodes X or Y to the state.
(iii) Alice sends the system to Bob.
(iv) After confirming that Bob has actually received the system, Alice pub-
lishes the method ((a) or (b)) which she employed to prepare the state
ρ.
(v) Bob makes a measurement on his received system to extract the encoded
information. We write Hilbert space of the received system as HB instead
of HA for convenience.
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Note that even if there is no eavesdropper between Alice and Bob, Bob does not
obtain in general the full information Alice has encoded. That is, the encoding
employed by Alice may be ambiguous one. ρi and ρj for i 6= j may not be
distinguishable perfectly. In the following we will see that Eve’s eavesdropping
in addition makes Bob’s information gain less. Let us see what Eve can do. Eve
who wants to obtain information encoded by Alice can make her own apparatus
interact with HA when it is sent to Bob. She may keep the apparatus and only
after knowing Alice’s announcement, may make a measurement on it to obtain
a classical output. Denote HE the Hilbert space of Eve’s apparatus. Eve’s
operation is described by a unitary operator U : HB ⊗ HE → HB ⊗ HE . A
state of the apparatus before the interaction is written as |Ω〉 ∈ HE . Without
loss of generality, we can assume it as vector state. Eve’s attack is determined
by the triplet, (HE , |Ω〉, U). After Alice’s announcement, Eve tries to make an
optimal measurement Z, a POVM, on her apparatus to extract the encoded
information. What we are interested in is the trade-off between the information
gain by Bob and one by Eve. Let us suppose a fixed Eve’s attack (HE , |Ω〉, U).
We define I(X : B) as optimal information gain by Bob on random variable X .
That is, if Alice has encoded X to the quantum state and Eve employs an attack
(HE , |Ω〉, U), Bob’s optimal information gain on X is I(X : B). In the same
manner, I(Y : B) is defined as information gain by Bob on random variable Y .
I(Y : E), on the other hand, is defined as optimal information gain by Eve on
Y if Alice has encoded Y to the quantum state ρ and Eve employs the attack
(HE , |Ω〉, U). I(X : E) is defined as optimal information gain by Eve on X .
Theorem 2 For a fixed Eve’s attack (HE , |Ω〉, U), the following inequalities
hold:
I(X : B) + I(Y : E) ≤ H(X) +H(Y ) + 2 logmax
i,k
‖F [{pj, ρj}]
1/2
i F [{ql, σl}]
1/2
k ‖,
I(X : E) + I(Y : B) ≤ H(X) +H(Y ) + 2 logmax
i,k
‖F [{pj, ρj}]
1/2
i F [{ql, σl}]
1/2
k ‖,
where POVMs, F [{pj , ρj}] and F [{ql, σl}] are defined by (1).
Proof:
To calculate Bob’s and Eve’s information gain, we construct an appropriate
probability distribution. We apply the remote ensemble preparation technique.
Suppose that ρ can be diagonalized as ρ =
∑
k λk|e
A
k 〉〈e
A
k | and thus {|e
A
k } forms
a basis of HA. We introduce {|e
B
k 〉}, a basis of HB and use {|e
A
k 〉} and {|e
B
k 〉}
to identify both Hilbert spaces. Let us introduce a virtual entangled state on
HA ⊗HB . A normalized vector |Φ〉 ∈ HA ⊗HB is defined as,
|Φ〉 :=
∑
k
√
λk|e
A
k 〉 ⊗ |e
B
k 〉.
As we have explained, this state can be used for the remote ensemble prepara-
tion in case of existence of Eve. In fact, if Alice operates a POVM F [{pi, ρi}]
(F [{ql, σl}]) on this state, Bob obtains a state ρi (σl) with probability pi (ql).
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The effect Eve gives on it can be included by defining a new state,
|Ψ〉 := (1⊗ U)|Φ〉 ⊗ |Ω〉.
If Alice applies a POVM F [{pi, ρi}] (F [{ql, σl}]) on this state, she obtains an
outcome i (l) with probability pi (ql) and the state of Bob and Eve then is U(ρi⊗
|Ω〉〈Ω|)U∗ (U(σl ⊗ |Ω〉〈Ω|)U
∗). Let us consider arbitrary POVMs B˜ := {B˜b}
of Bob’s and Z := {Zz} of Eve’s. We write the random variable representing
the outcome of Bob’s (Eve’s) measurement also as B˜ (Z). A-posteriori state
ρB˜=b,Z=z of HA with respect to these POVMs is written as
tr(ρB˜=b,Z=zA) :=
tr(ρAB˜bZz)
tr(ρB˜bZz)
for an arbitrary operator A on HA. We apply the entropic uncertainty relation
to this state. The observables to be concerned are POVMs: F [{pj , ρj}] and
F [{ql, σl}]. We obtain,
H(X |B˜ = b, Z = z) +H(Y |B˜ = b, Z = z) ≥ −2 logmax
i,k
‖F [{pj, ρj}]
1/2
i F [{ql, σl}]
1/2
k ‖.
SubtractingH(X)+H(Y ) from both sides and summing them up with 〈Φ|B˜bZz|Φ〉,
we obtain,
I(X : B˜, Z) + I(Y : B˜, Z) ≤ H(X) +H(Y )
+2 logmax
i,k
‖F [{pj, ρj}]
1/2
i F [{ql, σl}]
1/2
k ‖.
Using I(X : B˜) ≤ I(X : B˜, Z) and I(Y : Z) ≤ I(Y : B˜, Z), or I(X : Z) ≤ I(X :
B˜, Z) and I(Y : B˜) ≤ I(Y : B˜, Z) we obtain,
I(X : B˜) + I(Y : Z) ≤ H(X) +H(Y ) + 2 logmax
i,k
‖F [{pj, ρj}]
1/2
i F [{ql, σl}]
1/2
k ‖,
I(X : Z) + I(Y : B˜) ≤ H(X) +H(Y ) + 2 logmax
i,k
‖F [{pj, ρj}]
1/2
i F [{ql, σl}]
1/2
k ‖.
Since the POVMs B˜ and Z are arbitrary, we can take the optimal one for both.
Q.E.D.
This theorem gives nontrivial bounds if POVMs F [{pj, ρj}] and F [{ql, σl}]
do not commute with each other. That is, when Eve employs an operation that
should yield herself to obtain large information if the encoded random variable
was Y (X), Bob cannot obtain large information on X (Y ) that was actually
employed by Alice.
Let us consider the simplest example. The system consists of N -qubits. ρ is
the maximally mixed state, ρ = 1
2N
. Each bit has two natural basis correspond-
ing to the eigenvectors of σz and σx. Let b be an element of {z, x}
N . b naturally
determines a basis of N -qubit and an observable X [b] that is diagonalized by
this basis. We write b, the conjugate basis of b. It is defined by exchange all z
(x) to x (z). We write its corresponding observable as X [b]. In this situation,
we obtain,
I(X [b] : B) + I(X [b] : E) ≤ N.
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4.2 Information v.s. Randomness of Error
In [10] we derived a theorem [17] that relates information gain by Eve and ran-
domness of error contained in Bob’s data. Its derivation, however, relied upon
symmetrization technique and Holevo bound, and was complicated. We here
give another simple proof of the theorem by the remote ensemble preparation
technique and the entropic uncertainty relation.
Let us first begin with the setting. It is a special case of the above general
one. Let us consider two pairs of orthogonal states, {|0〉, |1〉} and its conjugate
{|0〉, |1〉} in C2. They are assumed mutually unbiased and thus
|〈i|j〉|2 =
1
2
holds for each i, j = 0, 1. Alice has N -qubits described by a Hilbert space
HA = C
2 ⊗ C2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ C2 (N times). For each i = i1i2 · · · iN ∈ {0, 1}
N , we
write |i〉 = |i1〉⊗|i2〉⊗· · ·⊗ |iN〉 and |i〉 := |i1〉⊗|i2〉⊗· · ·⊗ |iN〉. She prepares a
maximally mixed state ρ = 1
2N
of this system in one of the two different methods:
(a) she prepares a state |i〉〈i| with probability 1
2N
for each i ∈ {0, 1}N , or (b)
she prepares a state |j〉〈j| with probability 1
2N
for each j ∈ {0, 1}N . We write
a random variable A which takes value i ∈ {0, 1}N with probability 1
2N
. Alice
encodes this random variable to quantum state ρ by one of the methods (a) or
(b).
(i) Alice first selects (a) or (b) which is used to encode a random number.
(ii) Alice encodes the random variable A to the state ρ = 1
2N
according to
her choice on the method. That is, if she has chosen (a), Alice prepares
|i〉〈i| with probability 1
2N
. On the other hand, if her choice was (b), she
prepares |j〉〈j| with probability 1
2N
.
(iii) Alice sends the system to Bob.
(iv) Alice, after confirming that Bob actually has received N -qubits, informs
him of the method ((a) or (b)) she used.
(v) Bob makes a measurement with respect to the basis and obtains an out-
come. Let us write B the random variable representing this outcome. If
there is no eavesdropper, A = B naturally follows.
Eve wants to obtain the information of the random variable A. For the purpose,
Eve prepares an apparatus and makes it interact with the N -qubits sent to Bob
by Alice. Denote HE the Hilbert space of Eve’s apparatus. Eve’s operation
is described by a unitary operator U : HB ⊗ HE → HB ⊗ HE . A state of the
apparatus before the interaction is written |Ω〉 ∈ HE . Thus Eve’s attack is
determined by the triplet, (HE , |Ω〉, U). After the publication of the basis, Eve
tries to make an optimal measurement Z = {Zz}, a POVM (positive operator
valued measure), on her apparatus to extract the information of A.
8
What we are interested in is the trade-off between the information gain by
Eve and the errors contained in Bob’s outcome. Let us suppose a fixed Eve’s
attack. We define I(A : E|a) as Eve’s optimal information gain on A if Alice
has chosen the method (a) for encoding. I(A : E|b) is defined as Eve’s optimal
information gain on A if Alice has chosen the method (b). We can show the
following theorem.
Theorem 3 Information gain by Eve inevitably makes Bob’s data in another
basis random. More precisely, for the fixed Eve’s attack (HE , |Ω〉, U), the fol-
lowing inequality holds:
I(A : E|a) ≤ H(A⊕ B|b),
where H(A⊕B|a) is the Shannon entropy of the error contained in Bob’s out-
come when Alice has chosen the method (a) for encoding.
Proof: For the proof, we employ the remote ensemble preparation technique.
Since the state prepared by Alice is maximally mixed state, the relevant entan-
gled state of HA⊗HB is maximally entangled state: |Φ〉 :=
1
2N
∑
i |i〉⊗ |i〉. The
effect of Eve’s attack can be included by defining a new state,
|Ψ〉 := (1⊗ U)|Φ〉 ⊗ |Ω〉.
Now suppose that Eve employed a POVM Z := {Zz} and obtained a value z. We
write ρz, a-posteriori state on HA ⊗ HB. To this state, we apply the entropic
uncertainty relation. To introduce relevant POVMs, we fix a basis to define
transpose operation as {|i〉}. It is convenient to introduce a new basis {|i〉} as
|i〉 :=
∑
j |j〉〈i|j〉. In fact, the transposition of |i〉〈i| =
∑
j,k |j〉〈j|i〉〈i|k〉〈k| with
respect to the basis {|i〉} can be simply written as, |i〉〈i|. Let us define observ-
ables FA and FA on HA as FA :=
∑
i∈{0,1}N i|i〉〈i| and FA :=
∑
i∈{0,1}N i|i〉〈i|.
Let us define observable GB on HB as GB :=
∑
j j|j〉〈j|. Observables to be
treated are FA ⊕GB =
∑
l lEl that gives probability distribution for A⊕ B in
(b) and FA ⊗ 1 =
∑
j jPj that gives probability distribution for A in (a). The
following inequality holds:
H(FA ⊕GB |Z = z) +H(FA ⊗ 1|Z = z) ≥ −2 log
(
max
l,j
‖ElPj‖
)
. (2)
Thus we must estimate ‖EkPj‖. From
FA ⊕GB =
∑
l,i
l|i〉〈i| ⊗ |i⊕ l〉〈i⊕ l|,
we obtain El =
∑
i |i〉〈i| ⊗ |i⊕ l〉〈i⊕ l|. Therefore
ElPj =
∑
i
|i〉〈i|j〉〈j| ⊗ |i⊕ l〉〈i⊕ l|
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holds. To estimate the norm of this operator, we introduce a normalized vector
|Φ〉 :=
∑
ku αku|k〉 ⊗ |u〉 and apply ElPj on it.
ElPj |Φ〉 =
∑
i
αji⊕l|i〉 ⊗ |i⊕ l〉〈i|j〉
gives
‖ElPj |Φ〉‖
2 =
∑
i
|αji⊕l|
2|〈i|j〉|2
≤ max
i
|〈i|j〉|2
∑
i
|αji⊕l|
2
≤ max
i
|〈i|j〉|2.
Thanks to |〈i|j〉| = |〈i|j〉|, we obtain
max
lj
‖ElPj‖ ≤ (
1
2
)N/2.
Application of this inequality to (2) leads us
H(FA ⊕GB|Z = z) +H(FA ⊗ 1|Z = z) ≥ N
Taking an average with respect to z and adding N to both sides, we obtain
I(A : Z|a) ≤ H(A⊕B|b).
Since the POVM Z is arbitrary, we obtain the theorem. Q.E.D.
5 Summary
In conclusion, we derived a generalization of the information-disturbance the-
orm. Our generalized theorem can treat a general source (a pair of ensembles
that give the same state) and relate Eve’s information gain for an ensemble with
Bob’s information gain for another ensemble. The result is a direct consequence
of the entropic uncertainty relation.
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